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Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure
and Rationale for Immunity in
Defense of Habitation and Defense
of Property Under the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated
§§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2
by Robert Christian Rutledge*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is 11:49 p.m. Sarah's arm quivers as she pumps the shotgun. She
yells again at the silhouette prying at the lock on the rear door of her
house. "Get out of here! I'm gonna shoot!" Sarah points the shotgun
awkwardly toward the lower part of the french door. The silhouette
punches through the pane of glass near the doorknob, unlocks the
doorknob, and begins patting around for the deadbolt. Sarah closes her
eyes and squeezes the trigger. The shotgun flashes and kicks. The
silhouette-Sarah's ex-boyfriend--emits guttural groans and fierce
expletives as he limps from the porch and into the backyard, dragging
his right leg. Sarah sees him hop and stumble into the darkness beyond
the floodlight. Sarah runs into the kitchen, where she finds her cell
phone. She calls the police.
The police secure the yard. One officer tries to calm an irate neighbor.
Another officer radios the address to an ambulance coming to pick up
Sarah's ex-boyfriend. He has fallen from loss of blood while attempting
to climb the fence. Though in and out of consciousness, Sarah's ex* Assistant Public Defender, Rome Circuit, Georgia. Georgia State University (B.A.,
1995); University of Georgia Law School (J.D., 2005; M.A. Latin, 2006). Participant in the
Georgia Public Defender Standards Council's Honors Program.
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boyfriend explains to the police: "I told you when I called. She took the
keys to my car and locked me out of the house. I know I'm not supposed
to be here, but we made up. I was just knocking on the door and she
shot me. She shot me!"
Sarah loses her breath. She turns to the nearest officer. "I ... I
called you! I talked to the operator!" she shrieks. "He was trying to kill
me! He wasn't trying to leave! He smashed the window in!" The officer
tries to calm Sarah down, but Sarah begins struggling and trying to
confront her ex-boyfriend. As Sarah struggles, and officers firmly
restrain her, another officer calls dispatch and checks the names of
Sarah and her ex-boyfriend for prior arrests and offenses. Apparently,
Sarah had unsuccessfully petitioned for a restraining order against her
ex-boyfriend to keep him out of her house. In turn, the ex-boyfriend
reported Sarah for making terroristic threats on two occasions, but she
was not arrested. Unable to determine conclusively who had been the
aggressor in this instance, the police arrest both.
Two days later, Sarah's ex-boyfriend is still recovering in the hospital
under close supervision. Sarah spent the last thirty-nine hours in jail
and has finally found a family member to put up a property bond for
her. Based on its review of the records, the State has pressed charges
against both parties: criminal trespass against the ex-boyfriend and
aggravated assault and aggravated battery against Sarah.
II.

STATUTORY IMMUNITY FOR THOSE DEFENDING HABITATION AND
PROPERTY

Georgia law provides statutory immunity for a person charged with an
assault that arose in defense of property including habitation and real
property.1 Such a defense would apply to the scenario above. The
procedure for utilizing those immunities, however, is not clear in the
applicable statutes, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
sections 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2 (the "Immunity Statutes"),2 or in
recent cases applying those statutes. This Article proposes a procedure
for using those immunities as efficiently as possible. While seeking an
efficient procedure, this Article also attempts to ascertain the rationale
and policies behind the Immunity Statutes.
First, this Article examines Georgia's statutes, cases, and legislative
history related to immunity for defense of property and habitation.
Second, this Article examines how other states deal with this particular
kind of immunity in their statutory schemes. In that section, a Colorado

1. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, -24.2 (2007).
2. Id.
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statute addressing immunity for defense of habitation is examined, as
are the Colorado cases elaborating upon the nature of a pretrial
immunity procedure based on the Colorado statute. Finally, this Article
proposes a procedure for conducting pretrial immunity hearings for
Georgia in light of the language of the statutes, the legislative history,
and the possible policy rationale. For a perspective helpful in considering the proposed procedure, the final section considers Colorado's policy
and the application of its statute as a comparison. Ideally, the proposed
procedure will help implement the immunity demanded by Georgia's
Immunity Statutes.
A.

O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2

The limits for the use of force in defense of property are provided in
O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24. Section 16-3-23 addresses the
defense of habitation, and section 16-3-24 addresses the defense of real
property other than habitation.3 Section 16-3-24.1 defines habitation as
"any dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business," and defines personal
property as "personal property other than a motor vehicle" to distinguish
personal property from the kind of real property dealt with by the
statutes.4
Under the Immunity Statutes, the defense of habitation justifies a
person's use of force more broadly than the defense of other real
property. Most of the sections and subsections of the Immunity Statutes
limit the force to the amount that the person reasonably believes
necessary to prevent trespass, entry, attack, or interference with the
property. As discussed below in Part IV.B.1, however, O.C.G.A. section
16-3-23(2) may not require the defender of habitation to have an
objectively reasonable belief.5 Section 16-3-23, which addresses defense
of habitation, justifies the use of force "which is intended or likely to
cause death or great bodily harm,"6 only under the following circumstances: (1) when the use of force is necessary to prevent the "assault
or offer of personal violence" after an "entry is made or attempted in a
violent and tumultuous manner," and the person "reasonably believes
that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or
offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein";7 (2)

3. Id. §§ 16-3-23, -24. Although O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.1 defines personal property,
O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2 do not address personal property. O.C.G.A.
§§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.2.
4. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.1.
5. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
6. Id. § 16-3-23.
7. Id. § 16-3-23(1).
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when a person "who is not a member of the family or household ...
unlawfully and forcibly enters or has... entered the residence and the
person using such force knew or had reason to believe" that the entry
had occurred in that manner;8 or (3) when the person who uses such
force "reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the
purpose of commiting a felony ... and that such force is necessary to
prevent" the entry.9
In contrast to section 16-3-23, section 16-3-24 justifies the use of force
in defense of real property other than habitation more narrowly. Like
most of section 16-3-23, section 16-3-24 limits the use of force to
instances when the person reasonably believes that force is necessary,
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes the force is
necessary to defend real property other than habitation. 10 However,
section 16-3-24 further limits the situations in which a person is justified
in defending real property from "trespass ... or other tortious or
criminal interference"1 ' to those situations when the property is
"[llawfully in [the defender's] possession," 2 "[1]awfully in the possession
of a member of [the defender's] immediate family,"" or when the
property belongs "to a person whose property [the defender] has a legal
duty to protect. " 14 Section 16-3-24 does not justify the use of force
"likely to cause death or great bodily harm" in those situations unless
the person "reasonably believes that it is necessary to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony." 5
The threat of force is also addressed in O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and
16-3-24. Each statute begins by providing that "[a] person is justified in
threatening or using force" to defend property.'6 Due to the disjunctive
language distinguishing threat and use of force, however, it is not clear
whether the limitations on the use of force in later subsections apply to
the mere threat of force. After this language, each statute then
addresses the use of force, but not the threat of force alone.'" The
distinction between threat and force is addressed below in Part IV.B.3,
which discusses the proposed procedure for immunity.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. § 16-3-23(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 16-3-23(3).
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24(a).
Id. § 16-3-24(a)(1).
Id. § 16-3-24(a)(2).
Id. § 16-3-24(a)(3).
Id. § 16-3-24(b).
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24.
Id.
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Both O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24 are governed by O.C.G.A.
section 16-3-24.2, which creates the immunity. 8 Section 16-3-24.2
provides that a person is immune from criminal prosecution if that
person uses force in compliance with section 16-3-23 or 16-3-24.'9 If
the person uses a weapon, section 16-3-24.2 provides immunity as long
as that person may lawfully carry or possess a weapon. 20 The statute
directs courts to consider O.C.G.A. section 16-11-131,21 which criminalizes the possession of firearms by convicted felons, to determine if the
party may lawfully carry or possess the weapon.22
B.

Application of the Immunity Statutes by Georgia Courts

The procedure used by Georgia courts to determine immunity under
the Immunity Statutes is unsettled, although the courts have sought an
appropriate procedure and have made a few attempts at implementing
it. In Boggs v. State,23 the Georgia Court of Appeals emphatically held
that, under the plain meaning of O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.2, criminal
proceedings are barred against a person who is immune, and that the
trial court must determine the immunity before the person's trial
commences. 24 Further, failure to raise this immunity defense prior to
trial may be a ground for reversal due to ineffective assistance of
counsel.2" In Benham v. State,26 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
the failure to request a jury instruction that includes the defense of
habitation as an affirmative defense constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.27
Because Boggs establishes that these statutes set forth immunity
defenses available prior to trial, and because Benham further establishes
that the failure to raise the affirmative defense of defense of habitation
before the jury is a ground for reversal based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, it appears that failure to raise the defense of immunity prior
to trial might also be considered ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus,
it is imperative that defense attorneys understand and apply this

18. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131 (2007).
22. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-24.2, -11-131; see Millen v. State, 267 Ga. App. 879, 883, 600
S.E.2d 604, 609 (2004) (holding that statute prohibiting convicted felon from possessing
firearm negates immunity under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.2).
23. 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003).
24. Id. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723.
25. Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518, 591 S.E.2d 824, 826-27 (2004).
26. 277 Ga. 516, 591 S.E.2d 824 (2004).
27. Id. at 517-18, 591 S.E.2d at 826-27.

634

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

pretrial immunity defense in applicable cases. It would also benefit
courts to take notice of this immunity in order to maintain judicial
economy by preventing retrials on this issue. Further, prosecutors,
obligated by their duty to justice, should take notice of the Immunity
Statutes and the required procedure in order to assess whether to
pursue prosecution, and in order to maintain convictions against
defendants with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A close
examination of Boggs, Benham, and other cases applying the Immunity
Statutes will help clarify the procedure used by Georgia courts to
determine immunity and guide courts in implementing the procedure
under those statutes.
The Georgia Court of Appeals analyzed the language of O.C.G.A.
section 16-3-24.2 and recognized the need for a pretrial proceeding to
determine immunity in Boggs.28 The defendant in Boggs had stabbed
someone who was attempting a car-jacking. Prior to trial, the superior
court found as a matter of law that the defendant was not acting in
defense of his car, and that the victim was trying to flee when the
stabbing occurred.2 9 The court of appeals held that this pretrial
determination was sufficient consideration of the defendant's immunity
and affirmed the defendant's conviction. 8°
In Boggs the Georgia Court of Appeals simply reviewed the trial
court's proceedings to determine whether, in retrospect, there had been
a sufficient opportunity for the trial court to consider the defendant's
immunity prior to the trial.3 In its reasoning, however, the court of
appeals noted the need for a specific pretrial hearing on the issue of
immunity.32 Relying on Black's Law Dictionary, the court of appeals
defined "immunity" as "exempt or free from duty or penalty" and defined
"prosecution" as "'[a] criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried
on by due course of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose' of
33
determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime. "
After considering these definitions, the court of appeals emphasized that
the issue of immunity must be determined by the trial court prior to
34
trial.

28. 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676, 1099 (5th ed.
1979)); accord People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (using plain
language and definitions in Black's Law Dictionary to hold that immunity must be
determined prior to trial).
34. Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723; accord Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975.
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In Benham the Georgia Supreme Court held that a defendant was
denied effective assistance of counsel when a defense attorney failed to
request a jury instruction on defense of habitation. 35 The defendant
injured a person with a box cutter when that person reached into the
defendant's car and grabbed her during a dispute.36 According to the
definitions under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.1, a motor vehicle qualifies as
habitation for the purpose of the Immunity Statutes.37 Instead of
requesting an additional defense of habitation instruction, however, the
defense attorney only requested jury instructions based on self-defense
under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-21, 38 and the defendant was convicted of
aggravated assault.3 9
Upon a motion for a new trial, the attorney explained that she
considered it best to request only self-defense instructions and argued
that the decision was at her strategic discretion. 40
The Georgia
Supreme Court disagreed and, after applying the test for determining
ineffective assistance of counsel, reversed the defendant's conviction. 4 '
The supreme court explained that, under the defense of habitation
statute, unlike the self-defense statute, the defendant might have been
justified in using deadly force disproportionate
to the force "necessarily
42
required to repel" the assailant's attack.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Carley disagreed with (1) the
majority's assessment of the defense attorney's decision and (2) its
interpretation of the defense of habitation statute. 3 Justice Carley
emphasized that, under both the self-defense statute and the defense of
habitation statute, a person must reasonably believe that the use of
deadly force is necessary."
According to Justice Carley, the only
difference between the two statutes, besides the attack on a habitation,
is the degree of violence required before deadly force becomes necessary.45 Thus, Justice Carley contended that the majority incorrectly
concluded that a defendant under either statute could use deadly force
when such force is not necessarily required.4 6

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Benham, 277 Ga. at 517, 591 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 516, 591 S.E.2d at 825-26.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.1.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 (2007).
Benham, 277 Ga. at 516-17, 591 S.E.2d at 825-26.
Id. at 517, 591 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 518, 591 S.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 517, 591 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 519, 591 S.E.2d at 827-28 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 520, 591 S.E.2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
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The opinions in Boggs and Benham demonstrate the need for a
specific, consistent procedure for determining immunity prior to trial.
Although the Georgia Court of Appeals in Boggs held that the superior
court's legal finding was sufficient to determine the defendant's
immunity,4 7 the court's reasoning demands that lower courts deal with
this issue specifically in the future, and with more deference to the
defendant's immunity, by holding an immunity proceeding prior to trial.
To comply with the holding of the Georgia Court of Appeals, Georgia
trial courts should either create a separate and specific proceeding to
determine whether the party is immune, or expand an already existing
proceeding, such as the preliminary hearing, to include a specific
immunity determination.4 8
A definite, consistent procedure for
determining immunity would also assist both defense attorneys and
prosecutors because, under the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in
Benham, failure to properly raise the immunity defense prior to trial
might result in a reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.49
Two other Georgia cases provide some guidance for immunity
proceedings. In Millen v. State,5 ° the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that the immunity proceeding may be preempted by the defendant's
criminal record. 5 ' In Blazer v. State,5" the Georgia Court of Appeals
recognized the need for a more structured proceeding, even though the
court approved the outcome of the superior court's immunity proceeding.5 3 As discussed below, the decision in Millen outlines a trial court's
discretion in allowing for a hearing,' while the decision in Blazer
suggests what an ideal proceeding might entail. 5
The defendant in Millen, who was a convicted felon, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to demand a pretrial
hearing to determine whether the defendant was immune from
prosecution under theories of self-defense or defense of habitation.56
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that a hearing would have been
useless because the immunity governed by O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.2

47. 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723.
48. See Guenther, 740 P.2d at 979 (holding that courts may either attach Colorado's
immunity hearing to preliminary hearing or hold separate hearing if charged on
information and that, in either case, probable cause should be determined first).
49. 277 Ga. at 518, 591 S.E.2d at 827.
50. 267 Ga. App. 879, 600 S.E.2d 604 (2004).
51. Id. at 883, 600 S.E.2d at 609.
52. 266 Ga. App. 743, 598 S.E.2d 338 (2004).
53. Id. at 744-45, 598 S.E.2d at 340-41.
54. 267 Ga. App. at 881-83, 600 S.E.2d at 608-09.
55. 266 Ga. App. at 745, 598 S.E.2d at 340-41.
56. 267 Ga. App. at 883, 600 S.E.2d at 609.
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does not apply to convicted felons who are not allowed to possess
firearms.5 7 Thus, had there been a motion for a pretrial immunity
hearing, the trial court could have denied such a motion as a matter of
law.58 The decision in Millen demonstrates that the issue of whether a
person could possess a firearm is a threshold issue and should be
addressed before determining if a pretrial immunity hearing is required.
The Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Blazer revealed the need for
more structure in a pretrial hearing. The defendant in Blazer relied
only upon written testimony as the substance of his pretrial motion for
immunity.5 9 The court of appeals stated that a live hearing would have
been better for determining factual issues but nonetheless affirmed the
superior court's procedure primarily because the court of appeals could
not disturb the outcome under its standard of review. ° The court
explained that "where the facts are in dispute and thus credibility
determinations are crucial, live testimony at an evidentiary hearing
would appear critical to allow the court to observe each witness's
demeanor, voice inflection, eye contact, and other credibility-related
circumstances." 61 Nevertheless, the court of appeals went on to explain
that the trial judge had become a finder of fact in this instance because

57. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2.
58. See MiUllen, 267 Ga. App. at 883-84, 600 S.E.2d at 609. Cf. Tarvestad v. State, 261
Ga. 605, 606, 409 S.E.2d 513, 514-15 (1991) (holding that convicted felon is entitled to jury
instruction of justification when he or she is charged with operating motor vehicle without
license in emergency situation); Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. 130, 131, 392 S.E.2d 896, 896
(1990) (holding that convicted felon is entitled to jury instruction of justification when he
or she is charged with illegally possessing firearm while keeping it away from children for
their safety). But see, e.g., Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 784, 785, 470 S.E.2d 326, 328
(1996) (holding that refusal to give self-defense jury instruction based on defendant's
prohibition from possessing firearm due to a prior felony conviction was reversible error).
The court's holding in Jones and the court's application of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 in Millen
appear to conflict. Compare Jones, 220 Ga. App. at 785, 470 S.E.2d at 328, with Millen,
267 Ga. App. at 881-83, 600 S.E.2d at 608-09. Because, in Jones, it was an error not to
provide a justification instruction if the convicted felon could possibly justify briefly
possessing the firearm solely for self-defense, it appears that such justification might be
applicable, and warrant a hearing, in the context of the Immunity Statutes. 220 Ga. App.
at 785, 470 S.E.2d at 328. Based on the plain language of the statute, however, it can be
argued that the legislature did not intend to extend the pretrial immunity to a convicted
felon possessing a firearm for self-defense, although this justification remains available as
an affirmative defense at trial. Although this issue might be raised in future cases, the
holding in Millen currently implies that the Immunity Statutes prohibit pretrial immunity
hearings for felons if they are prohibited from possessing or using a weapon, and they use
a weapon in defense of habitation or real property. 267 Ga. App. at 881-83, 600 S.E.2d at
608-09.
59. 266 Ga. App. at 744-45, 598 S.E.2d at 340.
60. Id. at 745, 598 S.E.2d at 340.
61. Id.
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he was required to resolve the conflict of written testimony.62 In such
a situation, the appellate court cannot disturb the trial court's decision
if it can be "supported by any evidence."' Though uncomfortable with
the proceedings, the court of appeals appropriately deferred to the trial
court under the "any evidence" standard.64
These cases demonstrate the need for a consistent, established
procedure for pretrial immunity hearings. The court in Boggs recognized
that the Georgia statutes demand a pretrial hearing because, by
definition, an immune party should not face prolonged proceedings to
determine immunity.65 The court in Benham established that a
defendant is entitled to an instruction on this immunity as an affirmative defense and implied that, in light of the other cases, it may be error
not to provide a pretrial immunity hearing if the facts support one. 6
Further, the court in Millen provided an example of a limit to a
defendant's right to a pretrial immunity hearing: the party's ability to
legally possess or use a firearm. Finally, the court in Blazer suggested that such a pretrial hearing might be better executed with live
testimony for the specific purpose of determining immunity.68 These
cases, however, only provide suggestions for the proceedings themselves
and give little insight into the policy behind the Immunity Statutes. The
legislative history of the Immunity Statutes and related statutes
provides insight into the policy behind immunity and guidance for the
necessary pretrial procedure.
C. Legislative History and Related Legislation
The Immunity Statutes grew from Chapter 26-9, "Defenses to
Criminal Liability," which was passed in 1968.69 The 1968 statute
derived from an earlier nineteenth-century statute.70 Prior to the 1968
amendment, section 26-1011 of the Georgia Code of 1933 stated that

62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 744-45, 598 S.E.2d at 340-41.
65. 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723.
66. 277 Ga. at 518, 591 S.E.2d at 827-28.
67. 267 Ga. App. at 883, 600 S.E.2d at 609. But see Jones, 220 Ga. App. at 784-85, 470
S.E.2d at 328 (holding that jury instruction of justification was required although
defendant was convicted felon who had possessed firearm briefly for self-defense). Based
on Jones, a pretrial immunity hearing should arguably also be available to determine if the
use of a weapon, as well as the defensive act itself, was justified. See supra note 58 for
further discussion.
68. 266 Ga. App. at 745, 598 S.E.2d at 340.
69. 1968 Ga. Laws 1272, 1272-74.
70. Id.
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there was no rational difference between justifiable and excusable
homicide and explained that homicide would be justifiable if used
in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony on
either; or against any persons who manifestly intend and endeavor, in
a riotous and tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another
for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person
dwelling or being therein. 1
The 1968 statute limited the use of force "intended or likely to cause
death or great bodily harm" for a person defending his habitation.72 A
person defending his habitation was permitted, under section 26-903, to
use lesser force in situations where the person reasonably believed that
"such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's
unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation."" The statute then
delineated two circumstances in which force "likely to cause death or
great bodily harm" might be used.74 The first circumstance, described
in subsection (1) of the statute, reflected the circumstance set forth
above in section 26-1011 of the Georgia Code of 1933. 7 r The second
circumstance, described in subsection (2), allowed such serious force
when the person reasonably believed that (1) the entry was made or
attempted in order to commit a felony and (2) such serious force was
necessary.76 The section of the 1968 statute addressing defense of
property other than habitation, section 726-904, is the same as the
current statute, O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.
Years later, to further protect a person rightfully defending his or her8
home, the Georgia General Assembly passed O.C.G.A. section 51-11-9,7
which granted immunity from tort liability to people who defend their
habitation under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23. 79 In 1986 Senators Turner,
Barnes, and McKenzie introduced Georgia Senate Bill 489.80 The bill
originally created immunity from tort liability for persons acting in
defense of habitation under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23 and in defense of

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1011 (Harrison 1933) (referring to Cobb's 1851 Digest, 784).
1968 Ga. Laws 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id.

76. Id.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1273-74.
O.C.G.A. § 51-11-9 (2000 & Supp. 2007).

Id.
1 GA. SENATE J. REGULAR SESSION 1986, at 467.
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other real property under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.s" In its substitute,
however, the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Constitutional Law
narrowed the bill to provide immunity only for persons who could justify
their action under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23.82 On February 14, 1986,
the Georgia Senate accepted this amendment and unanimously passed
O.C.G.A. section 51-11-9.83
Subsequently, the Georgia House of
Representatives also passed the bill.84 Thus, under O.C.G.A. section
51-11-9, a person is immune from tort liability as long as the person
defends his or her habitation in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 16-323, but a person may be subject to liability for defending other proper85
ty.
In 1998 the Georgia General Assembly brought this immunity into the
criminal context through two amendments to O.C.G.A. section 16-324.6 Those two amendments, O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-24.1 and 16-324.2, extended immunity to people who protect their habitation or
property in accordance with O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24. sv
Prior to those amendments, the defense of habitation and the defense of
real property would have been affirmative defenses.8 8 As discussed
above, those defenses must now be addressed prior to the commencement
of trial.8 9
The legislative proceedings for the passage of O.C.G.A. sections 16-324.1 and 16-3-24.2 provide insight into the policy behind the Immunity
Statutes that may help determine how best to administer pretrial
immunity hearings. The original bill, House Bill 1360, did not address
O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 or 16-3-24 at all.s ° Rather, the original bill
addressed O.C.G.A. section 16-11-126, 9' which was written to allow
people to transport weapons in private vehicles under certain conditions.9 2 Representatives Powell, Floyd, and Coleman introduced House
Bill 1360 in February 1998. 9' The bill passed the house and went to

81. Id.
82. Id. at 804.
83. Id. at 804-05.
84. Id. at 1834.
85. O.C.G.A. § 51-11-9.
86. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-24.1, -24.2.
87. Id.
88. See Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 704, 481 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1997)
(listing both defense of habitation and defense of property as affirmative defenses).
89. See supra Part II.B.
90. 1998 Ga. Laws 1153, 1153-54; 1 GA. HOUSE J. REGULAR SESSION 1998, at 148.
91. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126 (2007).
92. 1998 Ga. Laws 1153, 1153-54; 1 GA. HOUSE J. REGULAR SESSION 1998, at 148.
93. 1 GA. HOUSE J. REGULAR SESSION 1998, at 148.
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the senate.9 4 The senate then submitted the bill to the Committee on
Special Judiciary.9 On March 18, 1998, the committee returned a
substitute for the original house bill regarding O.C.G.A. section 16-11126. The substitute included two additional amendments that created
immunity applicable to the defense of habitation statute and the defense
of real property statute. Senators Crotts and Dean, of the 17th and 31st
districts respectively, propounded these two amendments. The senate
approved the bill and sent it back to the house for a new vote.96
On the following day, March 19, 1998, the senate substitute was read
to the house.97 At least some of the members of the house appeared to
believe that this immunity was too strong. Representative Teper of the
61st district sought to temper the immunity provided in O.C.G.A. section
16-3-24.2 by inserting the phrase "after a preliminary investigation,"
offset by commas, between the phrase "shall be" and the word "immune."98 After the amendment, the overall phrase would have read as
follows: "A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code
Section 16-3-23 or 16-3-24 shall be, after a preliminary investigation,

immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless any deadly force used
by such person utilizes a weapon [which that person cannot carry or
possess according to other statutes]."99 Either out of desire to pass the
bill without returning it to the senate, or out of desire for the more
powerful immunity, the house of representatives refused to adopt
Representative Teper's new amendment by a vote of 129 to 30.100
Representative Powell then moved that the house accept the substitute,
including the new amendments from the senate, and the bill passed by
a vote of 133 to 32.101

Another relevant amendment to O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23 was added
in 2001.102 Retaining all the other parts of the defense of habitation
statute, the Georgia General Assembly inserted subsection (2).1 3 This
subsection allows the use of deadly force or force likely to cause great
bodily harm when three elements are met: (1) the force is used against
a person who is not a family or household member, (2) the person is
entering or has entered the residence forcibly and unlawfully, and (3)

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1010-13.
Id. at 779-80.
2 GA. HOUSE J. REGULAR SESSION 1998, at 1766-68.
Id. at 2543-45.
Id. at 2544.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 2544-45.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
Id.
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"the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that an
unlawful and forcible entry occurred."10 4 This language is distinct
from the language in the other two subsections of O.C.G.A. section 16-323 and does not invoke the same standard of objective reasonableness in
assessing immunity.
In his treatise on defense of habitation and other property, Robert
Cleary explains that subsection (2) was added because the reasonableness language in the pre-2001 statute required the resident to act with
reasonable belief in situations that unfolded too quickly to determine if
the intruder was about to attack or commit a felony. 10 According to
Cleary, "the General Assembly added [subsection (2)] in order to permit
a resident's use of deadly force against an intruder without having to
satisfy either of the two reasonableness requirements." °6 Thus, a
person defending his or her habitation could be justified in using deadly
force under subsection (2) based on "mere knowledge or belief" about the
unlawfulness or forcefulness of the entry instead of the reasonable belief
that the person entering did so for the purpose of committing a
07
felony.

As a result of this statutory construction, Georgia's statutory scheme
has various levels of immunity for people who use force to defend their
homes or other property. The person who defends his or her habitation
has the highest level of immunity. That person is immune from both
criminal charges and civil liability if immunity can be established. The
person who defends his or her property other than habitation still
qualifies for some immunity. He or she is immune from criminal
charges, but this immunity is subject to a greater scrutiny that
intensifies with the degree of force the person employs to defend the
property. Unlike the defender of habitation, the defender of property is
not immune from civil liability. The most appropriate procedure for
finding immunity under the Immunity Statutes is discussed below in
Part IV, with some guidance from an analysis of Colorado's immunity
statute. First, however, in order to better understand the statutory
schemes of Georgia and Colorado, this Article considers the ways in

104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. ROBERT E. CLEARY, JR., KURTZ CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN GEORGIA
233 (2004 ed.) [hereinafter CLEARY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES]; accord ROBERT E. CLEARY, JR.,
MOLNAR GEORGIA CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS § 4-7 (6th ed. Supp. 20072008); Derek E. Empie, Defenses to Criminal Prosecution: Change ProvisionsRelating to
the Use of Force in the Defense of Habitations or Residences; Provide for Related Matters,
18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 25-27 (2001) (discussing policy leading to proposed amendment).
106. CLEARY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES, supra note 105, at 233.
107. Id.
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which other states deal with the issue of defense of habitation and other
property.
III.

DEFENSE OF HABITATION AND DEFENSE OF PROPERTY IN OTHER
STATES

This section examines the way in which states other than Georgia
have dealt with the defense of habitation and the defense of property in
their statutory schemes. This survey does not discuss the relevant
statutes in all fifty states, but it takes into account enough statutes to
understand a variety of ways to deal with these defenses. Ultimately,
this section focuses on Colorado's immunity statute-which is similar to
Georgia's-and its application by Colorado courts.
A. Other States' Statutory Constructionsof Defense of Habitationand
Property
At least one state, Montana, considers the right to defend the property
"of one's self, of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative or
member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest" from
wrongful injury by "[any necessary force" to be a basic personal
right."' 8 As explained in greater detail below, other states have
incorporated the defense of habitation-also referred to as "dwelling" in
many statutes-into self-defense or justifiable homicide.0 9 Among
their self-defense or justification statutes, those states have dealt with
other real property as premises under a separate provision, and they
have addressed personal property under yet another provision."0
Other states have incorporated defense of habitation into the defense of
property; still other states have separate statutes, some of which are
similar to Georgia's statutes."' Provisions in a few statutes create
presumptions to benefit defendants, such as Massachusetts's "Castle
Rule," which might remove the burden of pleading the defense affirmatively from a person who has allegedly defended his or her habitation.1" 2 Some states use immunity language but do not provide
immunity from prosecution; those states provide an affirmative defense
despite the statutory language." 3

108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-103 (2005).
109. See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
112. Commonwealth v. Painten, 709 N.E.2d 423, 430-31 (Mass. 1999) (finding MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 8A (LexisNexis 2002), or the "Castle Rule," inapplicable to the case).
113. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
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1. Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property as Affirmative Defenses. States that incorporate defense of habitation into selfdefense statutes expand the right of self-defense to include defense of
habitation when the nature of the crime committed or attempted in the
habitation endangers the person dwelling therein. 114 In the selfdefense regime, such defenses are affirmative defenses." 5 Those
statutes incorporate defense of habitation as a factor that allows for the
use of greater force or that makes retreat unnecessary before using
deadly force in self-defense." 6 A New Hampshire statute provides an
example of this construction of defense of habitation.117
The New Hampshire self-defense statute allows the use of deadly force
in self-defense if the person acting in defense (the "actor") reasonably
believes that the other person is likely to use unlawful force while
commiting a felony against the actor in the actor's dwelling or within its
curtilage." 8 This statute does not require the actor to retreat before
using deadly force in such a situation." 9 Another New Hampshire
statute addresses "Use of Force in Defense of Premises."

20

This

statute is broader than defense of dwelling statutes because it entitles
"[a] person in possession or control of [the] premises or a person who is
licensed or privileged to be" there to use "non-deadly force" against a
trespasser. 12 The statute allows the use of deadly force if the person
defending the premises would be allowed to use such force under the
self-defense statute or when the 122person reasonably believes the
trespasser is about to commit arson.
New Hampshire's self-defense statute governs the "Use of Force in
Property Offenses" in a similar way.12 A person may use force "to
prevent what is or reasonably appears to be an unlawful taking of his
property" or to prevent other actions against the person's property, but
a person may not use deadly force unless he or she is allowed to do so
under the self-defense statute. 124 Several other states have similar

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (LexisNexis 1996).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. § 627:4(II)(d).
Id. § 627:4(III)(a).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:7 (LexisNexis 1996).
Id.
Id.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:8 (LexisNexis 1996).
Id.
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statutory constructions. 125 These states treat habitations and dwellings as special places where, in self-defense, greater force may be used
more liberally. 2 ' In addition, these states limit the use of deadly force
in defense of premises and other property to instances involving specific
governed by the
crimes, such as arson or burglary, or to 1situations
27
dwelling provision in self-defense statutes.
Other states incorporate this construction into their statutes that
directly address defense of property as habitation, dwelling, premises, or
some other designation. For example, Kentucky incorporates the defense
into its "Protection of Property" statute. 128 The statute distinguishes
between "physical force" and "deadly physical force" used in protection
of property.'2 9 According to the statute, a person is justified in using
physical force if the person believes such force is necessary to prevent
criminal trespass or burglary in his or her dwelling. 13 0 A person is
permitted to use "deadly physical force" only when he or she believes
that the other person is "laittempting to dispossess him of his dwelling
otherwise than under a claim of right," "[clommitting or attempting to
commit a burglary of such dwelling," or "[clommitting or attempting to
commit arson of a dwelling or other building in his possession."' 3 '
from its selfThus, Kentucky's defense of property statute is distinct
32
statutes.
Hampshire
New
the
unlike
statute,
defense
Like Georgia, several other states have a specific statute for defense
of habitation. One example is the North Carolina defense of habitation
" 133
statute, which falls under "Burglary and other Housebreakings.
North Carolina's statutory scheme incorporates a defense for "Use of

125. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-3-23, -25, -26 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006) (similar
statutory scheme including justification of deadly defense against arson and burglary); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-607 to -609 (1997 & Supp. 2005) (similar statutory scheme); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-19 to -21 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (similar statutory scheme); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 563.031, .036, .041 (West 1999) (similar statutory scheme); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 35.10, .15, .20 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2008) (similar statutory scheme).
126. See statutes cited supra note 125.
127. Id.
128. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.080 (West 2006).
129. Id. § 503.080(1)-(2).
130. Id. § 503.080(1)(a).
131. Id. § 503.080(2).
132. For states with statutes similar to Kentucky's, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13407 to -408 (2001) (establishing defense of habitation and defense of property under
separate statutes and limiting use of deadly force with self-defense statute). See also ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 104, 108 (2006) (laying out parallel treatments of defense of
property and self-defense under two separate statutes); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 505,
507 (West 1998) (similar statutory scheme).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51 to -54 (2003).
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deadly physical force against an intruder.' 3 4 The defense is in
addition to, and governed by, other defenses under North Carolina's
common law.'3 5 It allows the occupant to use any degree of force to
prevent or terminate an unlawful entry into the home "if the occupant
reasonably apprehends that the intruder may kill or inflict serious bodily
harm to the occupant or others in the home or residence, or ... if the
occupant reasonably believes that the intruder intends to commit a
felony in the home or residence." 38
Illinois has a statutory construction very similar to Georgia's. It
justifies a person using "force against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or
terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling."' 37 The Illinois statute limits when a person may use "force which
is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm" to situations
similar to those described in the Georgia statute. 3 ' Illinois allows
such deadly force when "[t]he entry is made or attempted in a violent,
riotous, or tumultuous manner, and [the person acting] reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer
of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling," or when
the person "reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
the commission of a felony in the dwelling."'39 The Illinois statute also
incorporates immunity from civil liability for a person defending his or
her habitation against anyone acting
as an aggressor, 4 ° a role which
4
1
statute.1
another
is defined under
Illinois law also provides a defense for persons defending property
other than habitation.' 42 This section allows the use of non-deadly
force to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such force is
"necessary to prevent or terminate [another's] trespass on or other
tortious or criminal interference" with real property or personal property
which the person or a member of his or her household lawfully possesses
or if it belongs to someone "whose property [the person] has a legal duty
to protect."' 43 The statute also limits the use of greater force to

134. Id. § 14-51.1.
135. Id. § 14-51.1(c).
136. Id. § 14-51.1(a).
137. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-2 (West 2002).
138. Id. For a description of Georgia's Immunity Statutes see supra notes 1-22 and
accompanying text.
139. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-2(a)-(b).
140. Id. § 5/7-2.
141. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-4 (West 2002).
142. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-3 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
143. Id.
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situations in which the person reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent a forcible felony.'4 This section also incorporates
14
Other states follow this pattern or some variation
civil immunity.
146
thereof.
Exploring the application of these statutory structures is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, some observations can be made. While
these statutes vary in structure, they mainly provide for an affirmative
defense of justification. No statute, however, couches the defense
against criminal charges in terms of immunity. In general, a defendant
must raise the issue at trial, and the prosecution must disprove it to the
jury. In contrast to these statutes, Georgia's Immunity Statutes provide
for immunity from prosecution, which entitles a defendant to a pretrial
determination of the issue, in addition to defining an affirmative defense
that must be disproven at trial.
Two other
2. The "Castle Defense" and Immunity Language.
statutory methods of dealing with defense of habitation and real
property further distinguish Georgia's Immunity Statutes. This section
first considers another procedural layout, the "castle defense," and then
examines states that have used immunity language in their statutes but
have not permitted pretrial determinations of immunity.
The castle defense essentially eases the burden of an affirmative
defense for the defendant. The defense creates a rebuttable presumption
that an "owner, tenant, or occupier" of a place was acting reasonably in
self-defense if the person injured was committing an offense that
involved entering the place. 147 Rhode Island offers an example of a
castle defense statute in section 11-8-8 of its General Laws. 14 Under
this statute, if someone enters the premises and is killed or injured
while committing burglary, entry with intent to murder, robbery, arson,
stealing poultry, or any of the other crimes enumerated in sections 11-8-

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-405, -406 (2003) (similar statutory scheme
including force against entry made surreptitiously or by stealth). For hybrid statutory
structures, see, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 466 (2001) (summarizing degrees
of force used in relation to kinds of property), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 469 (2001)
(specifying force against person unlawfully in dwelling and listing features of encounters
that justify use of force, such as sudden and unexpected encounters), FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 776.031 (West 2005) (addressing several defenses of property under statute entitled "Use
of force in defense of others"), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.02 (West 2007) (justifying use of
deadly force to resist murder, or any felony, attempted upon defender in dwelling house).
147. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-8 (2002).
148. Id.
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2 through 11-8-6,'14 a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the
defendant. 50 In those situations, the statute presumes that the owner,
tenant, or occupier acted reasonably and "in the reasonable belief that
the person engaged in the criminal offense was about to inflict great
bodily harm or death upon that person" or anyone else lawfully on the
premises."' Massachusetts has a similar statute." 2 Both the Massachusetts and the Rhode Island statutes also relieve the tenant of any
duty to retreat in such instances.'53 Although those statutes alleviate
the defendant's burden for the affirmative defense, they still require the
trial to proceed up to that point and do not provide as strong a defense
as immunity, which acts as a bar to prosecution.
The language in the statutes of at least two other states seemingly
provides immunity to a person who is defending his or her home or
property. There is no evidence, however, that those statutes are actually
used as anything more than affirmative defenses. Statutes from Indiana
and Washington contain language clearly describing immunity.
Indiana's Criminal Code describes scenarios similar to those discussed
above."' Subsection (a) of Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2 provides
that "[n]o person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any
kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary." 5
Subsection (c) addresses the defense of
habitation and refers back to subsection (a) in describing instances when
deadly force may be used in defense of habitation.'5 6 Thus, it appears
that the immunity from legal jeopardy set out in subsection (a) should
extend to a person defending his or her habitation when that person
reasonably believes that deadly force "is necessary to prevent serious
bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a
forcible felony."157 Indiana courts, however, have not applied the
statute in this way. Rather, Indiana courts treat statutory immunity as
an affirmative defense. 58 For instance, in Loza v. State,59 the Indi-

149. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-8-2 to -6 (2002).
150. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-8.
151. Id.
152. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 8A; see also Painten, 709 N.E.2d at 431.
153. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 278, § 8A; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-8.
154. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2004).
155. Id. § 35-41-3-2(a). The statute's use of the word "person" is confusing. "[T]he
person" refers to the person using force to defend himself or herself. Id.
156. Id. § 35-41-3-2(c).
157. Id. § 35-41-3-2(a).
158. See Bell v. State, 486 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ind.1985) (treating statutory immunity
as affirmative defense); Wash v. State, 456 N.E.2d 1009, 1010-11 (Ind. 1983) (treating
statutory immunity as affirmative defense).
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ana Supreme Court emphatically held that the immunity language was
merely an expression of public policy, not a right to a pretrial determination of immunity.16 °
Washington's statute uses similar language, but like Indiana,
Washington's statute does not grant complete immunity to the person
claiming defense of habitation.1 6' The statute explains that "[n]o
person... shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for
protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or
her family, or his or her real or personal property."' 62 Despite this
language, Washington allows a person in this situation to go through a
trial. If a person is found not guilty for the reason of self-defense, the
person is entitled to reimbursement of "all reasonable costs, including
loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses." 63 Although this
statute allows for restitution, it still requires the person to go through
legal proceedings to determine whether the person reasonably defended
his or her property.'
Even though Indiana's and Washington's
statutory language appears to provide immunity, the defendant is
actually put into legal jeopardy, making the immunity qualified at best.
As shown through the examination above, most of the defense of
habitation and defense of property statutory constructions appear to be
a version of the affirmative defense of justification or self-defense. The
statutes providing the defense closest to actual immunity are the castle
defense statutes, which provide a presumption of valid defense of
habitation. While this presumption does alleviate the burden on the
defendant, the defendant must still assert the defense and await the
outcome at trial, no matter how brief the trial may be. In contrast to
those constructions of defense of habitation and property, Georgia's
statutes and cases provide immunity which must be determined prior to66
Colorado law provides for similar pretrial proceedings.
trial.6 5
Thus, in order to further distinguish Georgia's application of immunity,
this Article closely examines the Colorado immunity statutes and related
cases. As explained below, it is not only apparent that Colorado's
statutes and cases provide immunity similar to that provided for in

159. 325 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1975).
160. Id. at 176.
161. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.110 (West 2000).
162. Id. § 9A.16.110(1).
163. Id. § 9A.16.110(2).
164. Id.
165. Boggs v. State, 261 Ga. App. 104, 105, 581 S.E.2d 722, 723 (2003). For a
discussion of Georgia's application of its Immunity Statutes, see supra notes 23-68 and
accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 167-236 and accompanying text.
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Georgia, but it is also clear that immunity in Georgia is broader and
more protective for someone defending his or her habitation or real
property than it is in Colorado.
B.

Colorado's "Make-My-Day" Statute and Its Application

The Colorado statute that deals with defense of habitation is located
in section 18-1-704.5 of the Colorado Criminal Code (the "Colorado
Immunity Statute"). 167 The statute-which was dubbed the "make-myday" statute in its legislative proceedings-resembles the Georgia
In interpreting the
statutes that deal with defense of habitation."
Colorado Immunity Statute, Colorado courts have established the
proceedings and the weight and allocation of burdens for the statute's
application, both in a pretrial hearing and as an affirmative defense.
These cases, particularly the initial Colorado case that dealt with the
Colorado Immunity Statute, 169 provide some guidance for Georgia
courts applying Georgia's Immunity Statutes. The language of the
Colorado Immunity Statute, however, differs from the language of
Georgia's Immunity Statutes, and therefore the proposed proceedings for
Georgia cases will differ. Further, as discussed below, Colorado's
judiciary has seriously limited statutory immunity.170 Also, unlike
Georgia, Colorado law does not extend its immunity proceeding to the
defense of property. Nevertheless, the proceeding that Colorado has
instituted for the Colorado Immunity Statute should provide guidance
for pretrial immunity hearings in Georgia on either matter.
1. The Colorado Immunity Statute. The Colorado Immunity
Statute states its purpose outright: to recognize Colorado's citizens'
"right to expect absolute safety within their own homes."'71 In recognizing this right, the Colorado Immunity Statute justifies the use of
force-including deadly force-against an intruder. 7 1 According to
subsection (2) of the statute, an occupant of a dwelling is justified in the
use of any amount of force against an intruder when
the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has
committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry,
or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or

167. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5 (2006).
168. See id.; People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 317 n.1 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (Scott, J.,
dissenting) (discussing origins of the "make-my-day" title).
169. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987) (en bane).
170. See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text.
171.

CLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(1).

172.

Id. § 18-1-704.5(2).
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property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant
reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical
force, no matter how slight, against any occupant. 7 '
The statute also establishes that immunity from criminal prosecution
exists for the use of force in the above-described situations, as well as
immunity from civil liabilities potentially arising from personal injury
or wrongful death.17 4 Subsection (3) provides that "[any occupant of
a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be
immune from criminal prosecution for the use of such force." 7 5
Subsection (4) provides that "[any occupant of a dwelling using physical
force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions
liability
of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from any 1civil
76
for injuries or death resulting from the use of such force."
The Colorado Immunity Statute falls within a series of Colorado
statutes that justify the use of physical force, which are similar to such
statues in other states. 7 7 However, Colorado's specified immunity
procedure applies only to the defense of a habitation against an
intruder.7 8 As the statute's introduction provides, the purpose of the
Colorado Immunity Statute is to give citizens a right to expect safety
"within their own homes." 79 Despite the use of the word "dwelling"
throughout the immunity statute, there appears to be another statute
that addresses the use of physical force in defense of a person within a
"dwelling or business establishment." 8 0 In contrast to the Colorado
Immunity Statute, that statute only allows deadly force when the person
reasonably believes that lesser force is inadequate to prevent the
attack."8 ' The two Colorado statutes that address (1) the defense of
premises 182 and (2) defense of other properties' are similar to one
another, and when addressing the use of deadly force, they both refer to

173. Id.
174. Id. § 18-1-704.5(3)-(4).
175. Id. § 18-1-704.5(3).
176. Id. § 18-1-704.5(4).
177. See supra notes 108-64 and accompanying text.
178. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(1).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2)(b) (2006).
181. Compare id. (requiring reasonable belief that lesser force is inadequate) with § 181-704.5 (allowing any force so long as there is unlawful and uninvited entry and
commission of crime or intent to commit crime with physical force).
182. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-705 (2006).
183. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-706 (2006).
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the statute requiring a reasonable belief that lesser force is inadequate."& In light of the existing Colorado Immunity Statute that
describes the instances when pretrial immunity is available, these other
defense statutes only appear to permit affirmative defenses at trial."5
2. Judicial Decisions Defining and Limiting the Colorado
Immunity Statute. The Colorado Supreme Court in People v.
18 6
Guenther,
sitting en banc, established the initial procedure and
burden for persons seeking immunity under the Colorado Immunity
Statute. 18 7 Later, the Colorado Supreme Court, again sitting en banc,
modified the application of immunity under the Colorado Immunity
Statute in People v. McNeese.'" Under the court's reasoning in
McNeese, it appears that, although the defendant still has the same
burden of persuasion as in Guenther, the burden entails more elements
that the defendant must prove.'8 9 As discussed below, the decision in
McNeese might have either eviscerated the immunity or seriously altered
the defendant's burden under the Colorado Immunity Statute.' 90
In Guenther the court established that immunity under the Colorado
Immunity Statute must be determined prior to trial. 191 Ultimately, the
court's decision placed the burden on the defendant to establish
immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. 92 The court in Guenther further delineated the following specific factors that the defendant
is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
[that] (1) another person made an unlawful entry into the defendant's
dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable belief that such other
person had committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the
uninvited entry, or was commiting or [intending] to commit a crime
against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry; (3) the
defendant reasonably believed that such other person might use
physical force, no matter [how] slight, against any occupant of the
dwelling; and (4) the defendant used force against the person who
actually made the unlawful entry into the dwelling.191

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-705, -706 (referring to COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704).
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-704, -705, -706 (all lacking immunity language).
740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
Id. at 981.
892 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
Id. at 313-14.
See Guenther, 740 P.2d at 973-81.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 981.
Id.
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The trial court in Guentherdismissed the charges against the defendant,
who was accused of shooting three people who had come into his yard
and onto his porch." Although the trial court held a hearing prior to
trial, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, the trial court used the
wrong standard.'9 5 Apparently, this was the first case before the
Colorado Supreme Court that addressed the Colorado Immunity Statute.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Guenther held that the Colorado
Immunity Statute created more than an affirmative defense; the statute
also created the need for a pretrial determination of immunity.9 '
According to the court, the plain, imperative language of the statute,
coupled with definitions of "immunity" and "prosecution" as provided by
"
Black's Law Dictionary,97
' made it clear that the use of the term
"immunity" meant that the issue was to be decided prior to trial.' 9
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the use of the term
"immunity" distinguished the Colorado Immunity Statute from other
affirmative defense statutes, making any proceeding against an immune
party improper."'
To handle this immunity in a practical manner, the court in Guenther
held that Colorado courts should determine immunity after the
preliminary hearing: either shortly thereafter in a separate hearing on
motion to dismiss or as a second part of the preliminary hearing
itself. 00 In making its decision, the court observed that motions based
on this kind of statutory immunity, though different in evidentiary
matters, are similar to motions based on transactional or derivative
immunity, which are also dealt with prior to trial in Colorado.2"'
Additionally, the court reasoned that waiting until after the preliminary
hearing was practical because a defendant is not technically charged
until after a finding of probable cause, an issue which is determined in
a preliminary hearing; if no probable cause is found, the defendant is
discharged, and there would be no need to determine immunity. 2
The court also reasoned that waiting until after the preliminary hearing
is practical because Colorado county courts lack the jurisdiction to

194. Id. at 973-74.
195. Id. at 972.
196. Id. at 975; accord Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723.
197. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 676, 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
198. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975; accord Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723
(applying same "plain language" analysis).
199. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975.
200. Id. at 979 n.5.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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address felony cases beyond a preliminary hearing on probable
cause." 3 Therefore, in a felony case, the issue of immunity can only
be addressed after a transfer to the district court.'" However, without
the jurisdictional problem of a felony charge, the immunity hearing could
be attached to the preliminary hearing for a more efficient pretrial
process."'
The Colorado Supreme Court then addressed the scope of the Colorado
Immunity Statute and held that the plain language of the statute
applies immunity only to situations in which the homeowner has used
2 06
force against a person who has actually made an unlawful entry.
According to the court, the "'reasonable belief'" and "'appearance'"
factors in the statute only apply to the homeowner's perception of the
intruder's activity, once the intruder is inside the house after an
unlawful entry.2 7 Thus the court in Guenther held that force could
not be used against a non-entrant or a person lawfully in the home,
despite the homeowner's reasonable belief that entry was unlawful."'
Regarding the issues of burden allocation and weight, the court in
Guenther decided that the burden should be on the defendant asserting
immunity, and that the weight should be the preponderance of the
evidence standard.2 9 First, the court held that, in light of both the
United States Supreme Court's and the Colorado Supreme Court's
holdings regarding burdens on the defendant for affirmative defenses,
the burden of proving immunity prior to trial could be constitutionally
placed on the defendant.210 The court reasoned that the proceedings
used to determine immunity under the statute were analogous to a
pretrial motion to establish a statutory bar, which a defendant often has

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 979.
207. Id.; see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(2) (distinguishing between crime of
entry into habitation and commission, or attempt, of subsequent crime while within
habitation).
208. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 979.
209. Id. at 980.
210. See id. at 979-80. The court noted the Supreme Court decisions in which the
Court held that there is no violation of due process when the burden of proof for affirmative
defenses is allocated to a defendant. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987); Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215-16 (1977). The court further noted that, although placing
such a burden upon the defendant for an affirmative defense at trial violates due process
under the Colorado constitution, the allocation of such a burden on a pretrial motion for
dismissal is distinct and does not violate Colorado's constitution. Guenther, 740 P.2d at
980.
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the burden of proving."' According to the court, a defendant in a
pretrial motion is not subject to the same jeopardy as he or she would be
at trial, so there is no reason to remove the burden, whereas such a
burden would not be placed on a defendant's affirmative defense at
trial.2 12 The court also reasoned that the defendant would have
greater access to evidence to prove the immunity under the Colorado
Immunity Statute. 3
Although the court in Guenther placed the burden on the defendant in
the pretrial motion, the court neither placed an unwieldy burden on the
defendant nor took away the parallel affirmative defense derived from
the statute at trial.1 4 The court placed a burden on the defendant to
prove immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. 215 The court
reasoned that this kind of hearing was similar to postconviction-relief
proceedings and motions to suppress, situations in which Colorado had
placed the same burden on the defendant. 1 6 The court further held
that the legislative purpose of the statute-to benefit Colorado citizens
with maximum safety in their homes-extends to alleviate the burden
on the defendant and therefore only called for the preponderance of the
evidence standard. 217 The court refused to lighten the defendant's
burden any further because the force permitted under the Colorado
Immunity Statute could cause harsh injury, and because the defendant
would
be justifying actions that, but for the statute, would be crimi2 18
nal.

Another issue arose in Guentherthat might accompany the application
of the defense of habitation and defense of property statutes in Georgia.
The prosecution in Guentheralleged that, in determining immunity, the
trial court had overstepped its bounds under the doctrine of separation
of powers because discretion over immunity was a power attributed only
to the prosecutor as an executive officer. 21' The court held that the
determination of immunity, like findings on statutes of limitation or
double jeopardy, was an accepted role of the court in its adjudicatory
function. 220 Although the prosecution likened this power to allowing
immunity for witness protection, which is under the control of the

211. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980.
212. Id.

213. Id.
214.
215.

Id. at 980-81.
Id. at 980.

216. Id.
217.

Id. at 980-81.

218. Id. at 980.
219. Id. at 977.
220. Id.
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prosecution according to prior Colorado cases, the court held that the
imperative statutory language distinguished this new kind of immunity
decision.22 ' In other words, the language of statutes providing witness
immunity gave the prosecution discretion to exchange immunity in
return for testimony, whereas the imperative language of the statute
that provided immunity for defense of habitation commanded the court
to determine the immunity.22 2 Discretionary executive power like that
of the prosecutor was not available to the court under the statute
providing immunity for defense of habitation, and thus, the court did not
intrude upon executive power.
Although Guenther provides a template for analyzing Georgia's
Immunity Statutes and determining the procedure and rationale for
their application, another Colorado case, People v. McNeese, 3 must be
considered because, in its holding, the court restricted immunity for a
person defending his or her habitation under the Colorado statute. 4
The Georgia statute probably does not suffer from the same vulnerability
as the Colorado statute.225 The limitations imposed by McNeese should
be examined nonetheless because attempts at similar restrictive
reasoning might be used in efforts to limit immunity under the Georgia
statutes.
In McNeese the Colorado Supreme Court altered the burden on the
defendant to show immunity under the Colorado statute. 26 Although
the court did not increase the preponderance of the evidence standard,
227
Mcit made the Guenther requirements for proof more exacting.
Neese involved two fatal stabbings and an assault and attempted murder
within the defendant's apartment. One of the decedent victims was in
the apartment after being barred from the apartment by an oral lease
agreement between the defendant and another victim, who was the
decedent's wife (the wife had problems with the husband and had come
to stay with the defendant). The trial court found that the decedent
husband assaulted and threatened to kill the defendant after the
husband came into the apartment to help his wife move out. Moments
after the assault and the threat, the defendant killed the husband, killed
the husband's friend, and wounded the wife. The trial court found that
the defendant was immune to charges regarding the homicide of the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
892 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
Id. at 311.
See infra notes 318-48 and accompanying text.
McNeese, 892 P.2d at 311.
Id.
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decedent husband because the husband had (1) been barred from the
apartment, (2) entered unlawfully, (3) assaulted the defendant, and (4)
threatened the defendant with murder. The defendant was charged with
the assault and attempted murder of the wife and the murder of the
husband's friend, who was not barred and had the wife's permission to
be in the apartment.2 28
The Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en banc, held that the trial court
erred in its fact-finding and in the application of the Colorado Immunity
Statute; therefore, the court had jurisdiction to review the case de
novo. 229 On this premise, the court in McNeese began a tedious
reasoning process based upon the language of the statute and the
deliberations of the Colorado Legislature." ° At the conclusion of its
reasoning, the court determined there was within the statute an implied
standard that the trial court should have applied.2 31 This implied
standard addressed the intruder's state of mind for the "unlawful entry"
requirement. 2 2 The court in McNeese held that in order to satisfy the
unlawful entry requirement, the defendant must prove that the intruder
"knowingly" made an unlawful entry.23 In other words, the court held
that there is a requirement of a culpable mental state under the
unlawful entry element of the Colorado Immunity Statute.3 Thus, as
Chief Justice Rovira pointed out, an intruder could commit third degree
trespass under Colorado criminal law-entering the house "unlawfully"
under the trespassing statute-and yet a court determining immunity
could not consider this "unlawful" in the context of immunity for a
homeowner who defended against the trespasser.2 5
Under the
procedure set forth by the court in McNeese, a Colorado court could not
consider third degree trespass an "unlawful" act that the homeowner
could defend against because third degree trespass does not require
mens rea, a culpable mental state.3 6
Considering the difficult and attenuated reasoning that the majority
in McNeese utilized in adding a new requirement for proving immunity
under the defense of habitation statute, it appears that a pretrial
hearing in Colorado and the usefulness of such a hearing have become
limited. In Georgia, however, there is not as much flexibility in the

228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 305-07.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 311.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.

235. Id. at 316 (Rovira, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. Id.
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language of the Immunity Statutes. As explained below, Georgia's
Immunity Statutes can be more clearly understood from the analysis in
Guenther, but due to the distinct language of the Immunity Statutes,
they should not fall victim to the narrow reasoning in McNeese.
IV.

PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR GEORGIA'S PRETRIAL HEARING ON

IMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE OF HABITATION AND DEFENSE OF PROPERTY

A.

Framework for ProposedProceedings

This section sets forth the author's proposed pretrial immunity
procedure and the policy and rationale behind the structure for a
pretrial immunity proceeding ("Immunity Hearing"). Then this section
discusses the Georgia statutes in light of the Colorado statute and cases.
But first, a framework is set out to provide a basic understanding of the
proposed procedure.
As demanded by the court in Blazer v. State,237 an Immunity
Hearing should include oral argument and live witnesses.3 8 Also,
immunity should be determined as quickly as possible because, if the
person is immune, he or she should not face prosecution at all.23 9 As
the court in People v.Guenther24 ° explained, a person is not formally
charged until after probable cause has been determined.2 41 In Georgia
this occurs at the preliminary hearing, if one occurs, or through an
indictment or accusation. At that point, the issue of immunity arises
and must be dealt with immediately.
One way of addressing the statutory demand for a swift determination
of immunity would be to combine the Immunity Hearing with a probable
cause hearing and address both issues as a pre-indictment matter before
a superior court-similar to a motion for bail on serious offenses. In the
alternative, if the preliminary hearing must occur in magistrate court,
then the superior court should hold an Immunity Hearing as soon as the
case is bound over to superior court. In contrast to the allowance of
hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings, however, hearsay should not
be admissible at an Immunity Hearing because the Immunity Hearing
should not be governed by a burden as light as probable cause. If a
person is not incarcerated and is not entitled to a preliminary hearing,
the superior court should hold an Immunity Hearing as a pre-indictment

237. 266 Ga. App. 743, 598 S.E.2d 338 (2004).
238. Id. at 745, 598 S.E.2d at 340.
239. Id.
240. 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
241. Id. at 979.
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hearing similar to a motion for bond or hold an Immunity Hearing as a
special plea in bar immediately after the grand jury indictment or the
accusation.
As a threshold issue, the defendant must first show that the property
concerned in the alleged confrontation qualifies as habitation or other
real property under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.1.242 If the defendant has
used a weapon, the defendant must also show that he or she was not
prohibited from using or possessing the weapon under O.C.G.A. section
16-3-24.2.243 Both of these issues should be addressed as threshold
issues in the Immunity Hearing and proven by accompanying documents, or they should be addressed immediately at the beginning of the
Immunity Hearing. If these issues are not addressed up front, the court
should hold that the defendant has waived his or her right to a pretrial
Immunity Hearing as a matter of law. Waiver of the Immunity Hearing,
however, should
not waive the affirmative defense ofjustification during
244
the trial itself.
In addition to asserting the threshold issues, in the Immunity Hearing
the defendant should designate the statute and the specific parts of the
statute under which he or she claims immunity. If the defendant did
not use force "intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm,"
then the immunity issue should be dealt with under the first clause of
O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23245 if it involves habitation... or under sec248
tion 16-3-24(a)2 47 if it involves real property besides habitation.
Under either of these sections, if the defendant used force, he or she will
have the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
force was used only to the extent that the defendant reasonably believed
was necessary.2 49 If the defendant has only threatened force, then the

242. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.1 (2007).
243. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 (2007); see supra notes 58 and 67 and accompanying text
(discussing whether convicted felons might nonetheless be entitled to immunity hearings
even though they illegally possessed weapons).
244. See Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 704, 481 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1997)
(listing both defense of habitation and defense of property as affirmative defenses). There
is no reason to assume that the failure to establish immunity prior to trial should
eviscerate the assertions as affirmative defenses at trial. Immunity to prosecution is
ancillary to guilt of the offenses and should be assessed with different burdens, as
explained below. See Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980 (determining that use of defense of
habitation as preliminary immunity defense does not preclude its use as affirmative
defense because immunity is ancillary issue).
245. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 (2007).
246. Id.
247. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24(a) (2007).
248. Id.
249. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24.
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matter becomes more complicated; however, the burden of proving that
the threat was reasonable should still fall on the defendant.
If the defendant has used force "intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily harm," he or she must choose whether to file a motion with
the court for an Immunity Hearing under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(1),
(2), or (3), or under section 16-3-24(b). 25 ° The choice will depend on the
circumstances under which the force was used. Different sections will
invoke different burdens, and the failure to designate the section will
place the burden of preponderance of the evidence on the defendant
during the hearing. The defendant can a file motion with the court
under multiple sections, but he cannot attain the most favorable
burden-a burden of preponderance of the evidence on the prosecution-unless exclusively motioning the court under O.C.G.A. section 163-23(2).251

Moving for an Immunity Hearing based solely on defense of habitation
under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) places a burden on the State to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was not defending
his habitation in the manner described under that subsection. However,
if the defendant's motion for an Immunity Hearing under this subsection
concerns any other subsection, the defendant should not retain this
generous burden. Filing a motion under any other section or subsection
dealing with the use of deadly or very dangerous force should invoke a
burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she was defending his or her habitation or real property in
the manner described by that section or subsection. This shift in the
burden occurs because the language of each applicable section or
subsection, other than O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2), evokes an objectively
reasonable standard, unlike the language in O.C.G.A. section 16-323(2).252 (The statutory language is analyzed and discussed below in

Part IV.B.)253 If more than one section or subsection fits the facts,
they may be asserted together, but the facts of each must be proven by
a common standard. Thus, if the defendant moves for immunity under
O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) as well as any of the other sections dealing
with defense of habitation, the defendant will assume a preponderance
of the evidence burden.

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24.
See infra notes 254-93 and accompanying text.
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Burdens of Proving Immunity under Georgia Law

1. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2): Broader Immunity in the Use of
Deadly Force or Force Likely to Cause Great Bodily Harm;
Burden of Preponderance on the State. The highest level of
immunity proposed springs from O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2).254 This
subsection allows the use of deadly force or force likely to cause great
bodily harm when a person "who is not a member of the family or
household ... unlawfully and forcibly enters or has ... entered the
residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe"
that the entry had occurred in that manner.2 5 This immunity calls for
the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
did not comply with the statute when he or she exercised force in
defense of habitation.
If the defendant has pleaded under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2), it is
stipulated that force was used and that it was deadly or might have
5
caused great bodily harm."
Under the subsection, after the defendant asserts and proves the threshold issues discussed above, the State
must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
did not know or have reason to believe that an unlawful or forcible entry
into the habitation had occurred.257 The State can prove this by
showing that the person subject to the use of force was not unlawfully
and forcibly entering or had not unlawfully and forcibly entered and that
the defendant did not know or have reason to believe that the entry was
unlawful and forcible. 25
However, O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2)
completely excludes such a defense if the person is a member of the
family or the household. 9 If the party injured by the defendant is a
family member by sanguinity or affinity, O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) is
precluded altogether.26 ° If the party injured is not clearly a member
of the family, however, the State must prove that the injured party was
a member of the household.2 6'

254. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
255. Id. (emphasis added).
256. A defendant would stipulate to a threat or the use of lesser force during an
Immunity Hearing addressing the use of lesser force, which is discussed below in infra
notes 278-93 and accompanying text.
257. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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The reason for placing the burden on the State in the context of
O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) is based upon the simple, plain facts required
to establish that the immunity defense is viable, the need for the swift
determination of immunity in this context, and the intimacy and risk of
the situation it describes. Essentially, the location of the event within
the habitation and the identity of the victim and his or her relationship
to the defendant are facts that speak for themselves. Moreover,
commentators assert that subsection (2) was added to O.C.G.A. section
16-3-23 because events in this defense of habitation scenario unfold
quickly and a person needs to be able to make an immediate decision to
defend his or her household.2 62 Accordingly, under this subsection, the
prosecution should bear the burden of disproving the plain facts in order
to overcome immunity in a situation that clearly speaks for itself.
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23(1), (3), and 16-3-24(b): Narrow Immunity
in Use of Deadly Force or Force Likely to Cause Great Bodily
Harm; Burden on Defendant. Unlike the language in O.C.G.A.
section 16-3-23(2), the statutory language in O.C.G.A. sections 16-323(1), 16-3-23(3), and 16-3-24(b) invokes a reasonable person standard. 263 Whereas O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) only requires that the
defendant "knew or had reason to believe" that the person injured had
264
made or attempted an unlawful forcible entry into the habitation,
O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23(1), 16-3-23(3), and 16-3-24(b) all require that
the defendant "reasonably believe[]" that the entry made or attempted
on the habitation, or the tortious or criminal interference with other real
property, would lead to an "assault[] or offer[] [of] personal violence" or
"forcible felony."26 This semantic distinction causes the burden to fall
on the defendant. By providing that the defendant must have "had
reason to believe," O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) simply requires that the
situation provided the defendant with the perceptions necessary to
believe that the other party had unlawfully and forcibly entered the
habitation.266 That section does not inquire into the reasonableness of
that belief.267 However, the language in O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23(1),
16-3-23(3), and 16-3-24(b) demands that the defendant "reasonably
believe[]," which adds a qualitative condition to the kind of belief on

262. CLEARY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES, supra note 105, at 233; Empie, supra note 105, at
25-27 (discussing policy leading to proposed amendment).
263. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23(1), (2), (3), -24(b).
264. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
265. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23(1), (3), -24(b).
266. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
267. Id.
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which the defendant based his actions.268 Each of these subsections
provides factors that are to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's actions.2 69 Unlike O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2),
those factors are less easily proven, and the defendant-as a person with
greater access to the habitation or property, and as the party most
directly involved in the event-has greater access to the facts sought to
determine the reasonableness of his actions.27 °
In most pretrial motions, it is not unreasonable to place the burden of
By asserting immunity, however, the
proof on the prosecution.
defendant is raising an affirmative defense prior to the trial under which
27 1
the defendant does not deny the action but seeks to justify it.

Unlike a motion to suppress, the defendant is not demanding that the
prosecution justify the State's actions in arresting the defendant or
searching the defendant's person or property;2 72 rather, the defendant
is asserting that, under the facts alleged, reasonable force was used to
protect his or her habitation or property. Thus, like an affirmative
defense at trial, the defendant must raise a claim to immunity or it is
waived, but unlike an affirmative defense at trial, the defendant must
also prove that he or she is immune from any further proceedings by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Beyond the threshold issues mentioned above, if making a motion
under O.C.G.A. 16-3-23(1), a person claiming immunity should prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that "the entry [was] made or attempted
in a violent and tumultuous manner," and that he or she reasonably
believed (1) "that the entry [was] attempted or made for the purpose of
assaulting or offering personal violence" to anyone who dwelt or was
present in the habitation, and (2) that the kind of force was "necessary
to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence."273 If making a
motion under O.C.G.A. 16-3-23(3), a person claiming immunity should
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she reasonably
believed (1) that the entry-whether tumultuous or not-was "made or
attempted for the purpose of committing a felony" in the habitation, and
(2) that the kind of force was "necessary to prevent the commission of

268. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23(1), (3), -24(b).
269. Id.
270. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980 (reasoning that defendant would have greater access
to evidence used to prove immunity).
271. Id. (explaining immunity as justification).
272. Note that, unlike Colorado, Georgia places the burden on the prosecution in a
motion to supress to prove that the arrest was conducted legally. Graddy v. State, 277 Ga.
765, 767, 596 S.E.2d 109, 111 (2004). According to Guenther, Colorado puts a burden of
preponderance of the evidence on the defendant in a motion to suppress. 740 P.2d at 980.
273. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(1).
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the felony."" 4 The former of these two subsections appears to deal
with an attack on the habitation or people within, while the latter
appears to address forms of burglary. It should be possible to make a
single motion based on both subsections.
Finally, under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24(b), if the defendant used force
"intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm" against someone
attempting to trespass or commit "tortious or criminal interference with
real property," the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he or she reasonably believed the force was "necessary to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony."" '
The term "forcible
felony" implies not that the felony would endanger the property, but
rather the defendant or someone else on the real property. This
language contrasts with the absence of the descriptor "forcible" in
O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(3)."6 Thus, under O.C.G.A. section 16-324(b), there must be risk to the defendant or someone else on the real
property which both arises from the felony and is also greater than the
risk of the felony defended against in defense of habitation. The other
factors listed in O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24 regarding ownership or
protection of the real property 2" should be plain facts, but if there is
a need to discover those facts, that burden should be on the defendant,
who will most likely have the best access to the necessary information.
3. The First Clause of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 and O.C.G.A. § 16-324(a): Threat or Use of Less-than-Deadly Force; Burdens in
Proving Appropriateness. Both O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23 and
O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24(a) restrain the amount of less-than-deadly force
that a person may use or threaten to use in defending habitation or
other real property.278 Under the first clause of O.C.G.A. section 16-323, the force or threat must be reasonable to prevent or terminate
unlawful entry or attack on the habitation. 9 Under O.C.G.A. section
16-3-24(a), the force or threat must be reasonable to prevent or
terminate trespass or criminal or tortious interference with real property
other than habitation.2 0 When addressing force, each statute prescribes that the person defending the habitation or other real property
must reasonably believe that he or she is applying force to the extent

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. § 16-3-23(3).
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24(b).
See O.C.GA. § 16-3-23(3).
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24(a)(1)-(3).
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24(a).
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24(a).
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necessary for the situation at hand. 28 ' Thus, when a defendant uses
force, there is an objective reasonableness standard under which the
defendant must prove the reasonableness of his or her use of force.
Based on the reasonableness language, and like the sections of the
Immunity Statutes that ask for reasonable belief, in order to prove
immunity for the use of less-than-deadly force, the defendant should
bear a burden of preponderance of the evidence to prove that the use of
force under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23 or O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24(a) was
justified.
Although the statute evokes a reasonableness standard in determining
whether the defendant was justified in threatening the force, the court
should carefully examine the nature of the threat when considering the
threat of force alone. The defendant's threat could be considered a
terroristic threat under O.C.G.A. section 16-11- 3 7 ,"s a simple assault
under O.C.G.A. section 16-5-20,2s3 or an aggravated assault under

The different requirements in those
O.C.G.A. section 16-5-21.2"
statutes should evoke different burdens when considering the reasonableness of the defendant's threat.
If the defendant threatened the alleged victim without a weapon and
without action toward the alleged victim, the only charge that the
defendant would face is a terroristic threat under O.C.G.A. section 16-1137(a).285 In such a situation, there is no assault, neither simple nor
According to
aggravated, because assault requires an action.'
O.C.G.A. section 16-11-37(a), unless the terroristic threat is corroborated
287
by a third party, a defendant cannot be convicted under the statute.
Thus, in an immunity hearing concerning a threat without a weapon or
without action toward the alleged victim, the prosecution should have
the burden of producing a corroborating witness. If the prosecution
cannot produce a third-party witness to the alleged threat, the defendant
should be found immune to prosecution because there is no crime for
which to be prosecuted. However, if the prosecution produces a witness,

281. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24(a).
282. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37 (2007).
283. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 (2007).
284. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 (2007).
285. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a); see Hamby v. State, 173 Ga. App. 750, 751,328 S.E.2d 224,
226 (1985) (holding that threat to commit violence alone was insufficient to establish
simple assault).
286. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20; Hamby, 173 Ga. App. at 751, 328 S.E.2d at 226.
287. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Although this statute falls under the heading "Offenses
Against Public Order," it has been applied broadly to include any threat of violent crime
against another person. Thomas v. State, 254 Ga. App. 226, 227-28, 561 S.E.2d 444, 447
.(2002).
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the burden of persuasion should fall on the defendant because the
Georgia Immunity Statutes still apply a standard of reasonableness to
the defendant's threat.28 Based on the evidence and testimony, the
court should then decide whether the defendant has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the threat alone was reasonable.
If the threat used in defending habitation or other real property
specifically involves action that "places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury" "' or involves "a deadly
weapon or ... any object, device, or instrument which, when used

offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious
bodily injury,""4 then the preponderance of the evidence burden should
be placed completely on the defendant because the threat involved an
action or a weapon and therefore must be shown to have been reasonable.29 ' No longer is there an issue of the appropriateness of verbal
threats. The language in the first clause of O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23 and
in O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24(a) calls for the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the threatening action or the
threatening use of a weapon was reasonable.292 Although beyond the
scope of this Article, it must be noted that this type of threat should be
distinguished from a failed attempt, which would be more appropriately
governed by the subsections of O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24
dealing with the use of deadly or very dangerous force.29
C. Policy for O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and 24.2
1. Locus of Immunity for Those Protecting Their Homes. As
seen in the examination of the Georgia Immunity Statutes, Georgia has
developed a locus of immunity to criminal charges and civil liability
around the home.2 94 This locus of immunity protects those who are

288. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24(a).
289. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2).
290. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2).
291. Situations described by those statutes involving attempts-such as "attempt[ing]
to commit a violent injury" under O.C.G.A.section 16-5-20(a)(1), or "discharging a firearm"
during an assault under O.C.G.A. section 16-5-21(a)(3)--are not applicable in considering
threats, because they involve actions which would be dealt with under the provisions
addressing the use of force as discussed in supra notes 254-77 and accompanying text.
292. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24(a).
293. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) with O.C.GA. § 16-520(a)(2) (distinguishing between attempting to commit violent injury and placing another
in reasonable apprehension of injury).
294. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, -24.2, 51-11-9 (2000 & Supp. 2007); see supra notes
255-93 and accompanying text.
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defending themselves, their household, and their real property.295
Immunity from criminal prosecution extends to include immunity from
charges involving real property. Immunity from civil liability, however,
is limited to defense of habitation, which includes a place of business or
an automobile.2 96
In light of the legislative history behind Georgia's Immunity Statutes,
Georgia appears to have adopted a policy similar to that expressed in the
Colorado statute.29 v The Colorado statute addressing defense of
habitation explains that its purpose is to recognize its citizens' "right to
expect absolute safety within their own homes."29
Georgia's movement toward establishing a similar expectation of absolute safety began
with the initial forms of O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and 16-3-24, which
allowed an affirmative defense of immunity for force or threat used in
protection of the home and real property.29 9 This affirmative immunity
defense was extended into300civil immunity for defense of habitation under
O.C.G.A. section 51-11-9.
The Georgia General Assembly then sought to enhance this expectation of absolute safety around the home. First, the General Assembly
alleviated the procedural burden on a person who has defended his or
her habitation or real property by making this immunity a pretrial issue
under O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-24.1 and 16-3-24.2.301 Finally, in light
of the difficulty of showing reasonable consideration behind an action
that could require split-second decisions, the legislature enacted
O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2).302
This newer subsection allows the
person defending his or her home great discretion in using force inside
the home against someone whom he or she perceives as entering or
having entered illegally and who is not a member of the family or
household. °3 Rather than requiring objective reasonableness, subsection (2) only requires that the defender "[know] or [have] reason to

295. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, -24.2, 51-11-9; see supra notes 254-93 and
accompanying text.
296. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-24.1, 51-11-9; see supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text.
297. For the specific details of the chronology summarized here, see supra notes 69-106
and accompanying text.
298. COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(1) (2006); see also Empie, supra note 105, at 25-27
(discussing policy leading to proposed amendment, which includes explanation of legislative
desire for greater safety and discretion for use of defensive force in one's home).
299. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23, -24.
300. O.C.G.A. § 51-11-9.
301. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-24.1, -24.2.
302. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2); CLEARY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES, supra note 105, at 233; see
also Empie, supra note 105, at 25-27 (discussing policy leading to proposed amendment).
303. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).

668

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

believe" that the intruder has "unlawful[ly] and forcibl[y]" entered or is
in the process of doing so." However, the plain facts demanded by
the statute seriously limit this defense."0 5
The efficiency of determining immunity under the Georgia Immunity
Statutes is an essential, imperative requirement. As seen in the
legislative history of O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-24.1 and 16-3-24.2, the
Georgia General Assembly refused to add any procedure or language
requiring any investigation before determining these immunities. 0
Thus, immunity must be determined as soon as the court has found
probable cause to press the charge. 7
The goal of the burdens ascribed to each kind of immunity under the
Immunity Statutes is efficiency.308 The burdens set forth above in
Part IV.B. were essentially burdens of preponderance either on the State
under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) or on the defendant under all the
other sections and subsections. 3 9 The reasoning behind the assignment of the burdens depends on the language of the statutes. The
weight of each burden relates to both the efficient nature of the
proceeding demanded by the statutes and also the consequences of the
outcome.
There are three reasons why a preponderance standard is appropriate
for the State when it has the burden under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2),
which addresses the use of deadly or seriously dangerous force against
a non-family or non-household member who is illegally entering or has
illegally entered the habitation.3 1
First, the preponderance of the
evidence burden upon the State is appropriate instead of the beyond a
reasonable doubt burden because, as the Colorado Supreme Court
observed in Guenther, the immunity issue is ancillary to the factual
determination of the defendant's guilt.3 ' In the pretrial hearing, the
defendant is not denying allegations; rather, he or she is providing a
justification that creates immunity.3 12 A negative pretrial determination of immunity would only result in continued legal proceedings in
which affirmative defenses of justification are still available. Thus, the
State is not proving guilt, but rather disproving immunity. Second, the
preponderance of the evidence burden is appropriately upon the State

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
See supra notes 254-93 and accompanying text.
2 GA. HOUSE J. REGULAR SESSION 1998, at 2543-45.
See Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980.
See id.
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because the statute demands an immediate hearing. In return for
expediting the determination of the immunity issue, it is reasonable to
hold the State accountable for proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
In contrast, to demand that the State prove the lack of immunity beyond
a reasonable doubt would consistently call the validity of such a quick
determination into question, due to the evidentiary pressure on the State
to create a case within a case on the immunity issue. Thus, the
reasonable doubt standard would inevitably defeat the efficiency sought
in determining immunity. The final reason the State should bear a
preponderance of the evidence burden under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2)
is that there should be a balance between the scrutiny of the defendant's
actions-considering their serious consequences-and the defendant's
right to protection from an intruder within his or her home without
having to prove a reasonable belief. Under section 16-3-23(2), the action
for which the defendant seeks immunity is an action of violence, possibly
resulting in death or serious injury. 1 3 However, under the subsection,
the defendant is not subject to an objective reasonableness standard.
Placing preponderance of the evidence burden upon the State keeps the
defendant's actions under some scrutiny, while not demanding that the
defendant prove that his or her actions were objectively reasonable.
The burden of preponderance of the evidence on the defendant under
O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23(1), 16-3-23(3), and 16-3-24 springs from the
language in those sections requiring reasonableness. 14 Under those
sections and subsections, even if the basic factual scenario of an incident
could be established, reasonableness of the use of force or threat in the
situation could still be unclear. Because the defendant has the most
immediate access to details concerning reasonableness, the defendant
should set forth the facts proving the reasonableness of his actions." 5
The preponderance of the evidence burden should be sufficient to
encourage this production. Consequently, the defendant will be required
to put forth more effort to show reasonableness at the pretrial stage,
rather than at the later point, during a trial, when the defendant would
need only to raise an affirmative defense in order to place a burden of
beyond a reasonable doubt on the State.316 It must be repeated that
the reason for placing the burden on the defendant under O.C.G.A.
sections 16-3-23(1), 16-3-23(3), and 16-3-24, and placing the burden on
the State under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) springs from the reasonableness language present in O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23(1), 16-3-23(3), and

313.
314.
315.
316.

O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23(1), (3), -24.
See Guenther, 740 P.2d at 990.
Cf id. (describing motion to dismiss as ancillary to factually proving guilt).
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16-3-24 and the more stringent factual scenario
needed to establish
17
immunity under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2).A
The proposed burdens, coupled with the proposed proceedings under
each section of Georgia's Immunity Statutes, will successfully implement
a locus of immunity from prosecution that emanates from the habitation
for the person defending his or her home. During the most intense
instance-a sudden forced invasion by a stranger-the defender can use
the force necessary to protect anyone or anything inside the defendant's
home based on his or her own judgment of the situation. In other
instances involving someone attacking the habitation and those within,
or entering it to commit a felony, the defender can assess the situation
to reasonably determine (1) if force should be used or threatened and (2)
how much force to use. In all of those instances, the defender cannot be
sued for tortious actions. Finally, in instances of trespass on real
property, the defender can determine reasonably whether the trespass
threatens someone on the property, including the defender, and respond
accordingly, but the defender should refrain from using deadly or
seriously dangerous force except in instances more akin to defense of self
or others.
2. FurtherPolicy in Light of Colorado's Immunity Statute and
Cases. Although the Colorado Supreme Court has demonstrated how
the language of the Colorado Immunity Statute can be read strictly to
create difficult burdens based on the kinds of facts that must be proven,
the Georgia Immunity Statutes do not suffer from such contorted
language. Colorado's statute demands
a reasonable belief that [the intruder] has committed a crime in the
dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends
to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the
uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes [the
intruder] might
use any physical force, no matter how slight, against
318
any occupant.
The language in the Georgia statutes may be interpreted to require an
analysis of the defendant's reasonableness in a less disjointed way-by
focusing on the defendant's reasonableness in light of the totality of the
circumstances. The language of O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(1) is most
similar to the language of the Colorado statute.3 19 For immunity
under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(1), the defendant is required to show that

317. Compare O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-23(1), (3), and -24 with O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2).
318. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(2) (emphasis added).
319. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(1).
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he or she reasonably believed that the "violent and tumultuous"
unlawful entry was "attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or
offering personal violence" to anyone living in or present320 in the
habitation, and that deadly or dangerous force was necessary.
Although this language resembles Colorado's requirement that the
defendant demonstrate a reasonable belief that the intruder was about
to commit, was committing, or had committed another crime besides the
entry, the Georgia statute focuses the reasonable belief requirement on
the defendant's assessment of the violent or tumultuous nature of the
intruder's unlawful entry or attempt.3 21 Instead of demanding that a
person defending his or her habitation reasonably assess, after the
unlawful entry occurs, whether a second crime distinct from the violent
and tumultuous entry will occur in the dwelling, the Georgia statute
calls for a person defending his or her habitation to reasonably assess
the cumulative purpose of the entry itself.3 22 Based on the violent and

tumultuous manner of the entry, O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(1) then allows
that person to take reasonable measures to prevent a reasonably
perceived violent purpose of the entry.123 In other words, the Georgia
statute requires the defendant to assess the intruder's purpose based
solely on the manner of the unlawful entry. 24 In contrast, Colorado's
use of the phrase "in addition to" appears to require the defendant to
make a reasonable assessment about an additional crime occurring
within the dwelling that is separate from the unlawful entry.325
Further, as observed by the court in McNeese, there is yet another
requirement in Colorado which makes it harder for a person alleging
defense of habitation to establish immunity. 2 In addition to establishing the unlawfulness of the initial entry, a defendant in Colorado
must establish that the intruder knew the entry was unlawful. 27
Thus, the Colorado Immunity Statute requires proof of the intruder's
knowledge of the criminality of the break-in and the defendant's
reasonable belief about what the intruder intends afterwards. 28
In contrast to the language in the Colorado Immunity Statute, the
language in O.C.G.A. 16-3-23(3) focuses on the purpose of the entry

320. Id.
321. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5 with O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(1).
322. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(1).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5; People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 311 (Colo. 1995)
(en banc).
326. 892 P.2d at 311.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 311-14.
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itself, not subsequent actions or deliberations of the intruder. 29 If the
person defending habitation reasonably believed that the intruder had
entered or was entering with the purpose of committing a forcible felony,
that defender is permitted to use necessary preventative force.33 ° The
defendant's reasonable assessment focuses on the entry itself, not the
intruder's actions or deliberations once he or she is within the habitation. Therefore, O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(3) circumvents the difficulty
of proving the reasonableness of the defendant's assessment of the
intruder's intent beyond the nature of the entry itself.
The remainder of the Georgia Immunity Statutes need not be
compared directly to the Colorado statute because Colorado's immunity
does not extend beyond the defense of habitation. It bears repeating,
however, that O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) is distinct from the other
sections and subsections of Georgia's Immunity Statutes because it does
not require reasonable belief.331 This lack of reasonableness language
completely distinguishes O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) from the Colorado
Immunity Statute. 332 The Colorado statute requires that the intruder
knowingly entered unlawfully and that the defender made a reasonable
assessment of the intruder's intent to commit another crime, 3
whereas O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) only requires an unlawful entry and
the assessment of whether the defendant had reason to believe that the
entry was unlawful and forcible.334 The distinct burden on the State
under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-23(2) springs from the lack of an objective
reasonableness requirement under that subsection.
Those distinctions aside, the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court
in Guenther provides insight for addressing other policy issues relevant
to the pretrial immunity hearing demanded by the Georgia Immunity
Statutes.3 33 In assessing the constitutionality of the Colorado Immunity Statute, the court in Guenther evaluated several issues set forth by
the prosecution regarding immunity in this context. 3 6 Initially, the
court used reasoning similar to that of the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Boggs v. State,33 7 consulting the plain language of the statute to
establish that the legislature intended for a person to be free from

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
1-704.5.
335.
336.
337.

O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(3).
Id.
Id. § 16-3-23(1)-(3).
Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2). CompareO.C.G.A. § 16-3-23(2) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 18Guenther, 740 P.2d at 977.
Id.
261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003).
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prosecution."8 Based on this reasoning, and like the court in Boggs,
the court in Guenther held that the statutory language barred prosecution of a person who complied with the statute in defending habitation.339 Thus, in both cases, a pretrial hearing was required to determine the immunity of the defendant.34 °
After this determination, the court in Guentherthen addressed several
issues that might be relevant in future Georgia cases dealing with
pretrial immunity. First, the prosecution in Guenther argued that the
court's power to determine immunity infringed on the executive
discretion of the prosecutor, who normally chooses whether to press
charges and whether to offer immunity in return for testimony.34 ' The
prosecution argued that the judiciary would usurp executive power on
the matter; however, the court pointed out that it had no discretionary
role in determining whether to press the charge, but instead had only a
fact-finding role in determining whether the statutory requirements
invoking immunity were met.342 The court reasoned that the statute
itself granted the immunity in its imperative language.343 According
to the statutory language, if the person defending his or her home meets
the requirements of the statute, the person is immune. 3 " Therefore,
under Colorado's Immunity Statute, neither the court nor the prosecution can exercise any discretion.3 46 Instead, the immunity was created
at the Colorado legislature's discretion; the legislature defines what
constitutes legal and illegal conduct
and establishes "statutory defenses
34 6
and bars to criminal prosecution."

The Georgia Immunity Statutes contain similar imperative language
regarding the immunity prescribed in O.C.G.A. sections 16-3-23 and 163-24. A person who uses force justified under those statutes "shall be
immune from criminal prosecution" as long as he or she was not
prohibited from using a weapon, if one was used.34 7 Therefore, like the
courts governed by the Colorado statute, Georgia courts do not assume
a discretionary executive role. Instead, as directed by the Georgia

338.
at 975.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Compare Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723 with Guenther, 740 P.2d
Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723; Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975.
Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723; Guenther, 740 P.2d at 976.
Guenther, 740 P.2d at 977.
Id.
Guenther, 740 P.2d at 977; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5.
See id.
Guenther, 740 P.2d at 977.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2.

674

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

General Assembly, courts must fact-find to determine, as quickly as
possible, whether the party is immune from prosecution.
In its discussion of a court's power to determine this kind of immunity
issue, the Colorado Supreme Court in Guenther pointed to analogous
issues of fact that courts consider to determine if statutory requirements
that create a bar against further proceedings have been met. 48 It
likened this determination of immunity to a court's determination of
whether a statute of limitations has run, whether a new case creates
double jeopardy, or whether the State has failed to provide a speedy
trial. 49 In those instances, the court is directed by statute to ascertain
the necessary facts, and if it does find those facts, the court is ordered
to dismiss the case or charge-in other words, the court has no
discretion. The immunity procedure described in Boggs, and prescribed
in the Georgia Immunity Statutes, also directs Georgia courts to make
non-discretionary decisions analogous to the examples cited by the court
in Guenther that do not infringe on the executive branch's authority. If
objections to Georgia's pretrial immunity proceeding arise on such
grounds, hopefully the Colorado Supreme Court's observations will assist
in supporting the constitutionality of Georgia's Immunity Statutes.
V.

CONCLUSION

As directed by the Georgia General Assembly and demanded by
decisions from the Georgia Court of Appeals, there must be a consistent,
efficient procedure to determine the immunity of a person defending his
or her habitation or other real property. The plain language of the
Georgia Immunity Statutes provides guidance, and the decisions of the
Georgia Court of Appeals delineate what is needed to implement those
statutes. Colorado's decisions and policies on immunity for a person
defending habitation also provide helpful insights and comparisons.
This Article provides guidance for Georgia courts presented with this
immunity issue and will assist courts in implementing statutes designed
to empower citizens to protect their homes and their real property.

348.
349.

Guenther, 740 P.2d at 977.
Id.

